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Abstract—In this paper we propose a modelling formalism,
Probabilistic Component Automata (PCA), as a probabilistic
extension to Interface Automata to represent the probabilistic
behaviour of component-based systems. The aim is to support
composition of component-based models for both behaviour and
non-functional properties such as reliability. We show how addi-
tional primitives for modelling failure scenarios, failure handling
and failure propagation, as well as other algebraic operators,
can be combined with models of the system architecture to
automatically construct a system model by composing models
of its subcomponents. The approach is supported by the tool
LTSA-PCA, an extension of LTSA, which generates a composite
DTMC model. The reliability of a particular system configuration
can then be automatically analysed based on the corresponding
composite model using the PRISM model checker. This approach
facilitates configurability and adaptation in which the software
configuration of components and the associated composition of
component models are changed at run time.
I. INTRODUCTION
In component-based systems, it is often beneficial to specify
both behaviour and non-functional properties at the component
level. In building systems as a software architecture of com-
ponents, composition can be used to automatically compose
and model both the behaviour and non-functional properties of
that system. In general, we advocate models of non-functional
properties which a) are compositional to support automatic
non-functional analysis of a given configuration from the
models of each component; b) define a link with architectural
configuration as the non-functional properties of a component
also depend on the context in which it is deployed, i.e.
bindings; c) have suitable semantics in order to accurately
represent the behaviour of software components.
Although this has been successfully explored for functional
behaviour models using LTS representations [1], [2], [3], [4],
these models do not include stochastic information, e.g. time.
Probabilistic extensions of LTS models [5], [6], [7] model
frequency of execution of actions and or their duration but
do not accurately capture the behaviour of component-based
systems due to the difficulty of representing probabilistic
behaviour [8]. Both LTS and the derived extensions do not
take into account the architectural configuration of a system
[9], [10], [11] when constructing the composite model. As
a consequence, they implicitly assume that all the provided
functionality of a component is used in any configuration.
Moreover, existing approaches for non-functional properties
that combine behaviour models with architectural configura-
tion are based upon manual representations of the control-flow
between components of a specific configuration [12], [13].
In this paper we propose a modelling formalism, Probabilis-
tic Component Automata (PCA) which complements comple-
ments Architectural Description Languages, such as Darwin
[10], to construct the system behaviour model of a given
system configuration from the representation of its parts. Our
model includes primitives to represent failure scenarios, failure
propagation and failure handling which closely resemble how
exceptions are used to deal with failures in object-oriented
languages. Before describing PCA in Section III, we first
conduct a brief review in Section II of existing formalisms
for modelling probabilistic behaviour, their inter-relationships
and limitations. We then illustrate the application of PCA for
reliability analysis using an example client-server system in
Section IV. Finally, we present conclusions and future work
in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Non-composable models
Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMCs) have been ini-
tially proposed by Cheung [14] to represent the reliability
of component-based systems. However, this approach faces
several limitations. Firstly, the model assumes that components
execute sequentially and thus cannot represent concurrent exe-
cution. Secondly, the DTMC model of a composite component
cannot be automatically constructed from the models of its
sub-components. Thirdly, this approach assumes that failures
occur independently in components bound to each other and
cannot represent failure dependencies and failure propagation
across component bindings. Existing extensions to cater for
failure propagation [15] and to consider mappings between ar-
chitectural patterns and corresponding DTMC representations
[16] also need be manually defined and as the model for the
entire system cannot be automatically constructed from the
representation of its parts.
B. Composable Models
Although performance models are compositional [17], their
semantics is based on the duration of actions. Consequently,
these models allow to answer questions such as “what is the
probability that the system fails within s units of time?” or
“what is the average time until the system fails?”. In contrast,
we focus on probabilistic compositional reachability analysis
of failure states to answer questions such as “what is the
probability that the system fails?” or “what is the probability
of failure after action a?”.
Probabilistic I/O Automata (PIOA) [5] are a probabilistic
extension of I/O Automata [18] that distinguish between input
actions, in which execution is determined by the environment,
and internal/output actions which are controlled by the com-
ponent. When composing two PIOA, only matching pairs of
input-output actions are synchronised, which correspond to
bindings between the provided and required interfaces of com-
ponents. Although distinguishing between input and output
actions allows PIOA to address some of the inconsistencies
encountered in probabilistic LTS [19], PIOA are required to
be input-enabled, i.e. each component must process any input
action at any time, regardless of its internal state. This makes
PIOA unsuitable for representing component-based software
systems.
Probabilistic Component Interface Protocols (PCIP) [6] are
a full probabilistic extension1 to Interface Automata, which
also makes a distinction between input/output and internal and
do not require input-enabledness. While in Interface Automata
input/output actions wait for the corresponding output/input
action to be ready for interaction, in PCIP a transition leading
to a special error state is included in the composite model
whenever an output action is ready to be executed and cannot
immediately synchronise with the corresponding input action.
These semantics hinder the applicability of PCIP for modelling
the behaviour of software components as method invocations,
denoted by output actions, are synchronous. Note that asyn-
chronous method calls can be modelled with synchronous
interactions using an additional component. On top of that,
traditional reliability analysis is based upon transitions to the
error state that represent failures of actions, e.g. communica-
tion failures.
Other approaches to reliability analysis based on the prob-
ability of reaching an error state as a result of failures are
described in existing surveys [20], [21]. However, a composi-
tional model that establishes a link with architectural models
and allows for representation for failures, failure propagation
and failure handling is still missing.
III. PROBABILISTIC COMPONENT AUTOMATA
We define Probabilistic Component Automata (PCA) as a
probabilistic extension to IA [22]. Probabilistic information
is added to the transitions between states and we redefine
accordingly the semantics of the operators to construct single
and composite models which can be related to programming
primitives. In composite models we follow the synchronisation
semantics of IA as it is closer to the behaviour of software
components. We further introduce an explicit representation
for failure actions and failure handling actions that is analo-
gous to the conventional use of exceptions in object-oriented
1Probabilistic Interface Automata [7] only support the composition of a
probabilistic model of the environment with a non-probabilistic model of the
software system.
(OO) programming languages. In addition, we show how ar-
chitectural information is necessary to construct the composite
model corresponding to a given system configuration.
Our model has been implemented as an
extension to the LTSA tool [1] and is available
at https://wp.doc.ic.ac.uk/dse/software/ltsa-pca/. The
implementation aspects are described in [23].
A. Definition
A Probabilistic Component Automaton is defined as P =
hS, q, E , , µi where:
• S is a set of states and q 2 S is the initial state;
• E = E in [ E loc: E in are input actions from the environ-
ment that follow reactive semantics; E loc = E int [ Eout
are locally controlled actions that follow generative se-
mantics, where E int and Eout are internal actions and
output actions, respectively;
•   ✓ (S ⇥ E ⇥ S) is the set of transitions.
• µ :   ! [0, 1] where µ(s, a, s0) denotes the probability
of reaching state s0 from state s through the execution of
action a, subject to:
8s 2 S,
⇣ X
(s,a,s0) 2  
a 2 Eloc
µ(s, a, s0)
⌘
= 1
| {z }
generative semantics
(1)
8s 2 S, 8a 2 E in,
⇣ X
(s,a,s0) 2  
µ(s, a, s0)
⌘
= 1
| {z }
reactive semantics
(2)
B. Modelling Basic Components
Just as Finite State Processes are used to specify Labelled
Transitions Systems, Probabilistic Finite State Processes (P-
FSP) [23] support incremental specification of PCA models.
The correspondence between P-FSP expressions and PCA
models is determined by the function pca : E ! PCA. Given
a P-FSP expression E, pca(E) = hS, q, E , , µi.
Prefix and choice are the basic P-FSP operators to incre-
mentally construct PCA models of basic components, whose
operational semantics are respectively defined by Rules 1
and 2. The operational semantics rules should be read as
Hypothesis
Conclusion .
(a, pa ! E) a,pa   ! E
(Rule 1)
A transition denotes a single instruction and consists of a)
the execution probability p, b) the action label a 2 E and c)
an action type:
• ? for input actions that model the receiving end of a
communication channel or methods that can be called;
• ! for output actions which denote the invocation of
methods or sending of messages;
• no-symbol for internal actions;
• ⇠ for internal failures, ⇠? for input failures and ⇠! for
output failures for failure modelling (more details in the
next sub-section).
The corresponding PCA is given by pca(a, pa ! E) = hS [
{p}, p, E [ {(p, a, q)}, µ [ {(p, a, q) ! pa} i.
(p1 a1  > E1 | . . . | pn an  > En) ai,pai    ! Ei
(Rule 2)
The choice operator defines possible outcomes from a given
state. If a1, . . . , an are locally controlled actions (internal
or output), then (p1 a1  > E1 | . . . | pn an  > En)
describes a PCA that initially engages in any action ai with
probability pi. In this case, the choice operator can be used
to model if or switch statements. On the other hand, if
a1, . . . , an are input actions, the action ai the PCA engages
in is dictated by the environment, i.e. other processes that
output ai. Input actions are given a default probability of 1.0
as, on composition, these actions inherit the probability form
the corresponding output action of the connected component
This case models how the provided interfaces of a component
are used by other components, which is only known in a
specific architectural configuration i.e., when the components
are bound. In both cases, the corresponding PCA model is for-
mally defined by the following. Let 1  i  n and pca(Ei) =
hSi, qi, Ei, i, µii, then pca(⇢1 a1  > E1 | . . . | ⇢n an  >
En) = h(
S
i Si) [ {p}, p, (
S
i Ei) [ {a1, . . . , an}, (
S
i i) [
{(p, ai, qi) }, (
S
i µi) [ {(p, ai, qi) ! pai}i.
C. Modelling Composite Components
While the previous operators enable the specification of
basic components, the parallel composition operator || is used
to construct the PCA model of a composite component from
the PCAs representing its sub-components. The semantics of
composite models is a probabilistic extension of the com-
position semantics of IA models. Synchronisation between
input and output actions models the interactions between two
components i.e., communication along component bindings
and internal actions of different PCAs are interleaved to model
their concurrent execution.
Note that parallel composition can only be applied to
compatible PCA models. Two PCA A, B are compatible iff:
EintA \ EB = ;, EintB \ EA = ;,
EinA \ EinB = ;, EoutA \ EoutB = ;.
These conditions ensure that synchronisation occurs solely
between a single pair of input and output actions. In practice,
this implies that parallel composition can only be applied to
synchronise single bindings to a provided interface. When a
configuration includes multiple bindings, the interface actions
of the components involved have to be differentiated before
constructing the composite model (see sub-section III-E).
A
(!a,pa)     ! A0 , B (?a,pa0 )     ! B0
A||B (a,
pa.pa0
⌘ )       ! A0||B0
(Rule 3)
A
(?a,pa)     ! A0 , B (!a,pa0 )     ! B0
A||B (a,
pa.pa0
⌘ )       ! A0||B0
(Rule 3)
A
(a,pa)    ! A0
A||B (a,
pa
⌘ )    ! A0||B
, a /2 EB B
(b,pb)    ! B0
A||B (b,
pb
⌘ )    ! A||B0
, b /2 EA
(Rule 4)
Synchronisation occurs only when both components are
ready to communicate, as input actions wait for a corre-
sponding output action to be ready for execution and output
actions wait for a corresponding input action to be ready for
communication (Rule 3). Internal actions are interleaved (Rule
4) to denote their concurrent execution. In Rules 3 and 4, ⌘
denotes a normalisation factor that preserves the generative
semantics of locally controlled actions. For instance, consider
that two PCA are both ready to execute internal actions x and
y and no other actions can be executed from their current state;
their concurrent execution is represented as two execution
paths: a! b and b! a. The normalisation factor determines
the probability of each of first action of each of those paths. A
full description of ⌘ and the associated cases is given in [24].
D. Failure Modelling
We introduce failure actions to model failure scenarios,
failure propagation and failure handling behaviour. If a PCA
is in state s and can execute an unreliable internal action e, a
transition (s,⇠ e, ERROR) leading to the ERROR state represents
the failure of e. While internal failures represent unexpected
executions such as runtime exceptions, transitions labelled
with output failure actions (s,⇠!e, ERROR) model externally
visible failures such as communication failures.
Both internal and output failures follow generative seman-
tics as they are locally controlled (see equation 1). On the other
hand, an input failure action (s,⇠?e, ERROR) denotes that a
PCA is able to handle the failure of the corresponding output
action from another component. These actions follow reactive
semantics as their execution is determined by the PCA that
fails (see equation 2).
The semantics of failure propagation and failure handling
in PCA is intuitively similar to exception handling. An output
failure action can be interpreted as an exception being thrown
while an input failure action corresponds to the exception
being caught and handled. This allows the representation of a
variety of failure handling behaviours. For example, the failure
of an inner component can be handled by an outer component
or by another component at the same level. It can also be
handled and a different failure action be output on a different
interface e.g. to a higher level component.
A
(!a, pa)     ! A0 , A (⇠!a, pf )      ! ERROR , B (?a, p
0
a)     ! B0
A||B (⇠a,
pf
⌘ )      ! ERROR
(Rule 5)
The operational semantics of the parallel composition op-
erator needs to be extended to represent failure propagation
and failure handling. Rule 5 defines that the failure of a
single component, if not handled, leads to the failure of the
composite component. If the failure action is handled, then it
Fig. 1. PCA model of Server component
becomes a local action in the composite model (Rule 6). While
the component that handles the failure executes the failure
handling behaviour defined by B00, the component that raises
the exception resets its behaviour to the initial state to be able
to continue further interactions.
A
(!a, pa)     ! A0 , A (⇠!a, pf )      ! ERROR ,
B
(?a, pa0 )     ! B0 , B (⇠?a, pf0 )       ! B00
A||B (a,
pf .pf0
⌘ )       ! reset(A)||B00
(Rule 6)
E. Relabelling and Hiding
The previous operators support the specification of basic and
composite components with single bindings to all provided
interfaces. The re-labelling operator / can be used to rename
transitions labelled with interface actions of a component to
support concurrent requests from multiple components bound
to a single provided interface. The components that share
the common resource need to rename their interface actions
accordingly so that individual requests from each component
can be distinguished.
Additionally, when applied to a PCA A, the hiding operator
\{a1, . . . , an} collapses, when possible, the transitions in A la-
belled with the internal or input actions {a1, . . . , an} ✓ E int [
E in, while maintaining the probabilistic reachability properties
of the original process. When applied to input actions, this
operator removes behaviour associated with unbound provided
interfaces, while when used for removing internal transitions
it reduces a PCA to its interface behaviour representation. A
full description of the algorithm that implements the hiding
operator and the complexity gains in compositional reliability
analysis are given in [24].
F. Automatic Construction of System model
After describing the semantics of the operators supported
by PCA, we now discuss how these can be used in con-
junction with the architectural configuration of a system to
automatically construct its composite representation. Consider
an architectural configuration Barch defined based on bindings
between provided and required interfaces of a set of compo-
nents. Before constructing the corresponding composite PCA
model of a given architectural configuration, the following
steps are applied to the PCA ACi model of each component
Ci.
1) Remove behaviour associated with unbound provided
interfaces:
• given set of unbound interfaces, determine sub-set of
input actions associated with unbound interfaces and
compute PCA ACi Barch denoting active behaviour
w.r.t. Barch;
2) Compute interface representation IACi Barch by remov-
ing internal behaviour;
In case there are multiple bindings to a provided interface in
Barch the relabelling operator is applied both to the actions as-
sociated with the multiple required interfaces and the provided
interface in order to distinguish requests from the different
components. After the above steps have been applied, the
composite model corresponding to the system configuration
Barch is obtained by composing the interface representation
of each component:
ABarch = IAC1 Barch k . . . k IACn Barch .
Given that each interface representation IAC1 Barch does not
contain behaviour associated with unbound provided inter-
faces, the composite model ABarch is a closed representation,
i.e. it does not contain input actions as these have all been
synchronised with the corresponding output actions. Such
model is automatically translated to a corresponding DTMC
representation which can be used in PRISM model checker
for analysis of reliability properties [23].
IV. EXAMPLE
In this section we describe a simple Client-Server system
to illustrate how the composite model for a given system
configuration is constructed using the PCA model of each
component and a specific architectural configuration.
Fig. 2. Architectural configuration of an example Client-Server system
Consider the PCA models of the Client (Figure 3) and the
Server (Figure 1) components. The Client PCA starts with
Fig. 3. PCA model of Client component
an internal action denoting a request, which then leads to
an output action representing the invocation of an interface
getContent. In order to accommodate both method invoca-
tions and message passing systems, an output action does not
wait for the result to be returned. Consequently, the output
action getContent is immediately followed by an input action
sendContent to denote the result of interface getContent
has been successfully received. On the other hand, the input
failure action getContent allows the representation of failure
handling behaviour in the case that the Client does not receive
a result. The internal action showErrorMessage can be seen
as the instructions included in a catch block for OO languages.
Furthermore, the Server PCA model starts with two
input actions denoting that the Server can respond to
an invocation to any of its two provided interfaces. Af-
ter invocation, both interfaces execute an internal ac-
tion requestImage/processContent to address the request,
which may fail with a certain probability; if the request is
successfully processed, a result is sent through a channel
which is 95% reliable.
Note that these models are not dependent on a particular
architectural configuration and can be used in any context in
which the components are deployed. For instance, both the
PCA of the Server and Client components do not assume
that will interact with a particular Client/Server. However,
both Server and Client assume a certain ordering of in-
put/output actions for interactions through bindings. In fact,
a specific architectural configuration can be valid, w.r.t. to
compatible bindings between provided and required interfaces,
whilst a mismatch between the expected interaction protocols
of both components exists. Although the Client and Server
components have a compatible interface protocol, the com-
posite model corresponding to the architectural configuration
in Figure 2 could be used to test for interface behaviour
compatibility using standard behavioural model checking tech-
niques such as deadlock analysis [1]. Such analysis can be
used in architectural assembly processes to filter incompatible
components, thus preventing the system from halting at run-
time as incompatible components are not deployed.
Furthemore, given that the Client is only bound to the
getContent interface of the Server, the Server PCA needs
to be adjusted by removing the behaviour associated with
unbound interface getImage. We also remove the internal
actions from both the modified Server PCA and the Client
PCA and then compute the composite model (Figure 4). The
resulting individual PCA models before composition only have
input/output actions and internal failure actions, though the
latter can be relabelled in order to omit all the information
about internal behaviour. As a result, the PCA models can be
seen as interface representations of each component w.r.t. to
a given architectural configuration. If the Server was a com-
posite component, its interface representation would preserve
the encapsulation property of its architectural model, as the
behaviour associated with interactions with its sub-components
would be hidden from external components, e.g. Client.
After translating the composite model to a DTMC, we
compute the probability of the Client-Server system failing
after one request: 1%. Note that since the Client component
handles the visible failure action sendContent, from the
Server component, only the internal failure processError
affects the reliability properties of the Client-Server system.
On the other hand, the reliability of the Client-Server system
would be lower if the Client component used the interface
getImage of the Server component due to the higher proba-
bility of internal failure action requestError.
Fig. 4. Composite PCA model of Client-Server system,
We have shown how PCA can be used to model the prob-
abilistic behaviour of component-based systems. A close link
with the architectural model is needed in order to automatically
construct a correct composite model for a given architectural
configuration.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our Probabilistic Component Automata provide an expres-
sive formalism to model the probabilistic behaviour of soft-
ware components. By combining the semantics of generative
and reactive models it is possible to construct composite prob-
abilistic behaviour representations that cater for reusability,
failure scenarios and how these are handled. The specifica-
tion burden is further reduced by modelling each component
individually, thereby facilitating incremental elaboration and
enabling the definition of more fine grained representations.
Autonomous architectural assembly driven by non-
functional properties requires an integration between architec-
tural, behavioural and adaptation aspects. Compositionality of
models, i.e. deriving a composite model from the models of
its parts, is a key requirement for systems to autonomously
adapt. PCA models are compositional and establish a close
correspondence between behavioural and architectural aspects.
Input and output actions correspond to provided and required
interfaces of component models such as Darwin [10]; the
architectural structure of composite components, which hides
internal bindings between sub-components, is preserved at the
behaviour level by applying the hiding operator to compute
their interface behaviour. Therefore, the reliability of alterna-
tive architectural configurations can be automatically analysed
at runtime using the corresponding composite PCA model.
Although the analysis itself is performed using a closed
DMTC, the composite system representation is automatically
constructed from the representations of its parts. Models of
individual components can be fine grained to allow detailed
analysis of the execution profile. However, when analysing
overall properties of systems the same level of detail may not
be required, in particular for system reconfiguration where
components are replaced as a whole. Using hiding and
minimisation, smaller composite models can be constructed
by reducing the representations of sub-components, before
applying parallel composition. The reduction gains can be
significant but depend on the properties analysed, as they
determine which internal actions can be removed. Another
advantage of constructing the system representation in this
way is that third-party providers can automatically generate
and provide interface behaviour representations of their com-
ponents without having to disclose internal behaviour.
We intend to extend PCA with variables to support late
specification of transition probabilities. This would allow re-
analysing reliability properties after changes in the execution
profile without having to re-construct the composite model
and re-run the model checking tools (cf. [25] for analysis with
parametric DTMC models). These would provide means for
scalable, accurate probabilistic analysis at runtime.
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